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Abstract
Game theory and other approaches have been used to characterize problems involving high-
exclusion-cost goods which also have the characteristic that marginal cost of an additional user is
zero over some range. These analytical tools have made valuable contributions to understanding
voluntary organizations and collective action. Resource systems for which composition or scale of
the resource is an important factor do not fit neatly into the types of problems which are typically
analyzed. The Quality Deer Management Association (QDMA) in Southern Wisconsin is used as
an example to illustrate where the existing literature must be modified to take account of
particular features of this resource problem. Schelling's multi-person prisoner's dilemma model is
modified to incorporate preferences and marginal benefits of deer quality to different types of
hunters and to explore issues of resource sustainability. Against the odds, the private QDMA has
successfully organized hunters to practice harvesting techniques consistent with improved herd
quality.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The assumption that individuals are motivated by self-interest yields satisfactory results
when applied to some goods while analyses of other goods provision and allocation are more
problematic. Attempts have been made to use the self-interest assumption to explain why
voluntary organizations form to provide goods which are characterized by high exclusion costs
and marginal cost of an additional user being zero over some range.
  These approaches and alternatives which allow for altruistic behavior are reviewed below.
Important contributions have been made to understanding collective action in a variety of settings.
However, they do not adequately model collective action to provide a high-exclusion-cost good
where the quality of the resource changes. The private voluntary Quality Deer Management
Association (QDMA) in Southern Wisconsin will be used as an example for this type of collective
action problem. The case will be modeled and its applicability tested with alternative examples.
A. Background
The Quality Deer Management Association formed approximately five years ago in
Southern Wisconsin in order to change the composition and size of deer herds. To achieve this
result requires a change in deer harvesting. The Department of Natural Resources could change
the hunting regulations which apply throughout the State of Wisconsin or voluntary group action
could lead to changes in hunting practices. The options will be contrasted below. 
For trophy hunters, the deer herds in Southern Wisconsin contain too few mature bucks
and too many does and small bucks (Wallenfang 1995). The QDMA tries to produce larger bucks      The QDMA is not only interested in changing the composition of the deer herd but also in reducing the overall size
1
of the herd by encouraging members to shoot more antlerless deer. This particular aspect of QDMA is not emphasized
in this paper.
2
by changing hunters' harvesting patterns.  QDMA members agree not to shoot bucks whose
1
antlers do not extend beyond the deer's ear tips. In contrast, DNR regulations specify that a legal
buck is any "deer with an antler 3 inches or more in length" (DNR 1995, 28).
The Association is the result of very modest beginnings. A family in Dane County,
Wisconsin, and relatives began the shift in hunting behavior by passing up one-and-a-half year old
bucks in order to have some of them grow up to become mature bucks. Next they invited
neighbors and friends to participate and then others (Sutter 1995b).
B. The Problem
The deer herd has a number of characteristics affecting the interdependence of the parties
involved. It is not feasible for an individual to fence an area, invest in deer management, and then
keep the benefits to him/herself. Property lines do not follow habitat requirements as the deer
move about in partly predictable, partly random patterns. While individual effects on the entire
deer herd are negligible, incompatibility exists for individual deer. The high exclusion cost of the
benefits of system management and high subtractability of resource units make this problem a
common pool resource (Ostrom 1994, Ostrom 1990). 
Since the resource system is large, individual management efforts will have a negligible
effect on the quality of the resource. Unless a threshold number of individuals coordinate their
efforts, there is no improvement in hunting quality. Foregoing one buck has no perceptible effect      Meat hunters are more likely to shoot antlerless deer and are not considered here.
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on the buck-doe ratio. The individual has no incentive to engage in management efforts since
individual benefits are negative until the threshold is reached. 
If enough hunters forego small bucks, more bucks will grow up to become mature adults.
Most hunters are trophy hunters  and when a large buck cannot be had, shooting a small buck is
2
considered more prestigious than a doe or fawn (Wallenfang 1995). The incentives are such that
the individual has more to gain from not cooperating in the management effort than from
cooperating, which constitutes a prisoner's dilemma. The question arises how to assemble a group
of cooperators, large enough to affect herd composition, and how to sustain the desirable
outcome. Game theory and approaches that allow for altruistic human behavior model collective
action problems and formation of private voluntary organizations. They will be discussed below.
II. VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
A. The Literature
1. Game Theory
Game theory tells us that uncoordinated actions by rational and self-interested individuals
do not necessarily lead to aggregate outcomes with the highest possible payoffs to the individuals
(Dawes et al. 1990). The equilibrium outcome in a basic prisoner's dilemma game, where neither
player cooperates, leaves the players worse off than if they had cooperated, but cooperation is
nevertheless elusive. 
In deer management, this translates into most hunters shooting small bucks because the
cooperative outcome of foregoing them in order to have larger bucks in the future is not in the4
individual's self interest. The non-cooperator who shoots small bucks is always better off,
regardless of the action of others. 
Sophisticated versions of the basic prisoner's dilemma game can lead to cooperation
among players and maximum payoffs to the individuals. One such setting involves an infinitely
repeated game with a trigger strategy of cooperating until someone no longer cooperates
(Gibbons 1992). Complete information is a prerequisite for the cooperative outcome. This setting
may be approximated by a close-knit and stable community of hunters. Finitely repeated games of
complete information do not lead to cooperative outcomes, however. Allowing for two-sided
asymmetric information in a two-person prisoner's dilemma may produce cooperation (except for
the last stages of the game) when tit-for-tat is a possible strategy with positive probability (ibid). 
An extension of the game-theoretic approach is Schelling's multi-person prisoner's
dilemma (Schelling 1978). The games are structured such that individuals who choose the
cooperative choice, no small bucks, will have negative payoffs until a minimum number
cooperate. Then the payoffs are positive because there are more larger bucks. 
The degree to which non-cooperators are better off than cooperators can vary across
games and over the range of cooperators (ibid). The number of cooperators necessary for positive
payoffs to cooperators (minimum coalition) becomes a critical variable. The difference between
payoffs from cooperating and not cooperating is also of significance as it determines the incentive
for not cooperating. Differential payoffs may increase or decrease as more individuals cooperate.5
2. Other Approaches
While game theory focuses on individuals' self interest, Robert Frank (1988) finds a role
for emotion as a way to solve the commitment problem characteristic of prisoner's dilemma and
other situations. In the long run, people who are known to behave altruistically are sought out as
partners by others and will seek out equally motivated individuals. For example, the QDMA may
invite individuals to join the association who are known to have cooperated in similar situations.
This allows them to reach superior outcomes to the equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma.
Elinor Ostrom (1990) describes group formation criteria for situations where potential
members of a collective action group cannot be chosen at random. In the case of QDMA, if a
region were to be set up for quality deer management, it would be desirable to have all or most
landowners in the area participate. Ostrom (1990) tentatively establishes seven rules for enduring
self-organized groups. Monitoring and graduated sanctions are prominent among them. Hunters
like to have their trophies admired by other hunters. In communities where friends and neighbors
are part of a hunter's social group, it is easy to monitor whether a group member deviated from
the agreed-upon rules. Graduated sanctions become operative in the form of social pressure to
cooperate, which varies from case to case. Younger hunters may get away with only mild
criticism, but repeated violation of the rules for long-time (successful) hunters may lead to severe
pressure, perhaps social ostracism (Steffens 1995).
Mancur Olson (1965) asserts that collective action to obtain a high-exclusion-cost good
will not occur freely in a large group of self-interested individuals. Coercion or some selective
incentive distinct from the high-exclusion-cost good is necessary to get individuals to join a large
organization to provide the good. The QDMA provides valuable information and a forum for6
social interaction as incentives to join (Sutter 1995a). Smaller group size, homogeneity of
individual interests, and social capital will make voluntary collective action more likely when
coercion and external incentives are absent (ibid; see also Schmid 1987 and Hayami and Ruttan
1985). 
Dawes et al. (1990) conducted experiments testing the hypothesis that group identity, as
established through communication among members, enhances cooperation. They find
considerable support for the hypothesis. QDMA meetings and the fact that many hunters know
each other as friends and neighbors should therefore facilitate cooperation. Past experiences with
cooperation may also explain voluntary group formation for collective action. Past experience can
build trust which can then at a later date carry over to other, even more complicated and very
different settings (Hirschman 1984). This does not, however, explain how initial trust was
established. 
Collective action and formation of private voluntary organizations is a form of institutional
change. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) view basic institutions as changing incrementally. The change
depends on the cost of achieving social consensus. The initial phase of quality deer management
reflects this pattern. The group progressed from small beginnings, including only the family then
neighbors and friends, to a later stage where other individuals were involved as well. 
B. Quality Deer Management Association: Special Case or Model
1. What Makes QDMA Different?
Many of the features identified in the various approaches to collective action and
voluntary organization as described in II A can be applied to the Quality Deer Management7
Association. The literature captures some of the features of QDMA but not others. Group
formation to solve the type of problem discussed here may be explained by approaches listed
above (see Steffens 1995 on QDMA as a common-pool resource) . The general setting of the deer
management problem corresponds to a multi-person prisoner's dilemma (Schelling 1978). There
are some special features, however, which will be explained in this section. 
Figure 1 shows the level of average payoffs on the vertical axis. Average, rather than
actual individual payoffs, are used because there is always some chance of shooting a large buck.
The average is then calculated based on the probability of shooting a large buck and an antlerless
deer for cooperators and the probability of shooting a large buck and a small buck for non-
cooperators. 
On the horizontal axis from left to right is the number of cooperating hunters not shooting
small bucks, n is the total number of hunters in the resource system, and n minus the number of
cooperators is the number of non-cooperating hunters, those willing to shoot small bucks. Curve
C is the expected payoff  to a cooperator as a function of the number of cooperating hunters. The
minimum coalition required for cooperators to break even is k. The curve NC is the level of
expected payoff to the non-cooperator as a function of the number of others who cooperate. 
At low levels of cooperation, average payoffs to cooperators are negative as there are
practically no large bucks to hunt and they forego the utility of shooting small bucks and only
shoot antlerless deer which afford them no status with other hunters. Non-cooperators also have
little chance of shooting a large buck but are willing to shoot small bucks from which they derive






Figure 3:Payoffs As A Function Of Number Of Cooperators
As more and more hunters forego small bucks, the probability of shooting a large buck
increases for all and both curves show a slight upward trend toward k. To the right of k the 
number of large bucks becomes significant and average payoffs for cooperators become positive.
At this point the two curves turn up sharply, reflecting the fact that significantly more large bucks
are shot by all. Additionally, as more hunters become cooperators, they shoot more antlerless deer
as a group, contributing to the reduction in herd size which improves habitat. This allows bucks to
grow bigger antlers.
When more large bucks are sighted before deer season hunters, cooperators and non-
cooperators, will then have the incentive to hold out for a bigger buck. Mature bucks are more
difficult to hunt because they tend to be more wary than small bucks and they often feed after
dark when hunting is illegal. Since large bucks are highly preferred by most hunters, small bucks
will very likely be passed up for the opportunity to hunt a mature buck, especially if one has been
spotted in the area. This behavior can move all hunters farther to the right of figure 1 where
average payoffs to all are higher.9
At n, the point where everyone in the management area is cooperating, the two curves are
shown to be fairly close together with NC slightly higher than C. No one is shooting small bucks.
This may be because of true cooperation, shooting of antlerless deer rather than small bucks, or
because there are enough large bucks for everyone to hunt one. If the curves were touching, the
average payoffs would be identical. However, for someone who cannot get a large buck, there is
still the incentive to shoot a small buck for the non-cooperator while a cooperator would forego a
small buck. Therefore the two curves are not drawn with identical payoffs at n.
Figure 1 shows average payoffs at any point in time. It is possible, however, that as time
goes by and the QDMA recruits more and more members, changes in hunting ethics develop and
the two curves begin closer together at the origin. Currently, the predominant hunting ethic is not
to shoot does and fawns (Steffens 1995). Learning reduces the prisoner’s dilemma. QDMA has
been successful in achieving more than the minimum coalition. This success is consistent with a
model where social factors work to achieve the minimum coalition and then the payoffs of
cooperator and non-cooperator converge as more people cooperate.
The desired outcome, a more balanced deer herd with more mature bucks, may be
sustained without anyone choosing the non-cooperative option. This will depend on how
successful hunters are in shooting a trophy and which option is chosen by unsuccessful trophy
hunters. If the latter hold out for a big buck until the end of the season, they will not shoot a deer.
If they do not hold out until the end of the season, they may opt for an antlerless deer or a small
buck. If not too many choose the small buck option, the desired composition of the deer herd can
be sustained over time from season to season without some hunters having to choose the10
cooperative option. Whether a hunter is successful in bagging a trophy depends on the number of
hunters, the density of mature bucks in the hunting area, the skill of the hunter, and some luck.
Changes in DNR hunting regulations and license fees can significantly affect QDMA
management efforts as can changes in meat hunting activities and random effects due to weather
and climate.
3. Alternatives to QDMA
The DNR can provide alternatives to the QDMA. Currently a legal buck is defined as a
"deer with an antler 3 inches or more in length" (DNR 1995, 28). If this definition were changed
to: a deer with an antler spread that extends beyond the ear tips, only larger bucks could be taken
legally. This rule could have the same outcome as QDMA. The difference lies in the flexibility
which the QDMA allows; hunters are not forced to join the QDMA and would not be violating
any laws by shooting smaller bucks. A DNR survey revealed that hunters are interested in big-
buck management but are opposed to tougher DNR regulations (Wallenfang 1995). Enforcement
could also be a problem if  hunters have difficulties estimating antler size correctly.
The DNR could also institute a lottery system by which a limited number of buck tags are
allocated to hunters who apply for them. Many hunters are opposed to this type of deer herd
management also. The QDMA allows those hunters who have very strong preferences for bucks
to shoot a buck, even if it turns out to be a small one, while those who have strong preferences
for big bucks but a significantly lower preference for small bucks forego less by shooting
antlerless deer.11
4. Applicability of the Model
Fisheries and the problem of over-fishing is a candidate for applying this analytic
approach. While fisheries share a lot of characteristics with deer herds, high exclusion costs,
marginal cost of an additional user being zero over some range, a highly mobile resource,
composition of the fish catch is generally not a significant factor in fishing. 
This is not true, however, in the shrimp industry, where large shrimp are sold at a premium
and therefore are more desirable (Johnson and Libecap 1982). Cooperative and non-cooperative
strategies here are foregoing small shrimp and not foregoing small shrimp, respectively. A
significant number of large shrimp do not become available until a minimum number of shrimpers
have foregone small shrimp.
Recycling also provides an example for using the approach described above. In this case a
minimum coalition of individuals who recycle is necessary in order to provide incentives for
industries (and technology perhaps) to develop that use recyclables as an input into their
production process. If the scale of recycling is large enough and production costs low enough, a
market for recyclables will develop to provide incentives to sell recyclables.
Thus, while the QDMA may look like a special case at first glance, similar problems exist
to which this approach incorporating quality change can be applied. 
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Goods which are characterized by high exclusion costs and marginal costs of an additional
user being zero have been analyzed in the literature using a variety of approaches. While game
theory, induced innovation, common-pool resources, and other analytical tools mentioned in this12
paper have valuable contributions to make toward explaining the formation of voluntary
organizations and collective action, quality deer management serves as an example of a problem
which has features not adequately addressed by the existing literature. 
Deer management combines a set of special features. Quality of the resource is an
important variable. A social dynamic is necessary to achieve a minimum number of individuals
choosing the cooperative option in order to significantly affect herd composition. Positive average
payoffs to cooperators set in when the utility of the increased chance of shooting a large buck
outweighs the disutility of foregoing a small buck.  As the number of large bucks and average
antler size increase, the payoff curves move closer together as the sacrifice required of
cooperators is less.
There is a temporal dimension to the case which is hard to model formally. When the
number of large bucks grows due to the forbearance of the earlier cooperators, both cooperator
and earlier non-cooperator can harvest the high-exclusion-cost good (big buck). The utility of the
hunt increases with the probability of shooting a big buck and the cost of foregoing small ones
declines.  Sustainability of the improved outcome is path dependent and once a positive payoff to
cooperation is achieved, the payoff curves accelerate and the gap between the curves narrows, as
the demands on altruism and other social dynamics decrease. Narrow calculation of advantage is
potentially sufficient to maintain the long-run sustainability of the system if the higher probability
of shooting large bucks does not lead to significantly increased hunting pressure. The unexpected
success of QDMA is consistent with this model and a sustainable outcome.13
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